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ABSTRACT 
 
DOES TRANSFORMATION OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
ACHIEVE DUAL MISSIONS 
: POVERTY REDUCTION AND FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY? 
 
By 
 
Daehong, KIM 
  
This study aims to assess the impact of institutional transformation of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) on poverty alleviation and financial sustainability, using cross-country 
and panel data sets from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) Market and the 
World Bank data. The analysis was conducted using pooled OLS with two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) and random effects regressions. In order to achieve this aim, the analysis was 
undertaken with respect to two criteria. On one hand, it examines whether the impact of 
transforming the legal status of MFIs from non-profits to for-profits on poverty alleviation; 
and on the other hand, from unregulated non-profits to regulated for-profits with regards to 
the dual missions: poverty reduction and financial sustainability. The results of the analysis 
suggest that, taking into account endogeneity with loans of MFIs, a country with higher loans 
from non-profits tends to have larger effects on reducing poverty than that of for-profits. 
With respect to regulation on MFIs, the net impact of unregulated non-profits on poverty 
alleviation is still larger than that of regulated for-profits. Especially, only the unregulated 
for-profits have a significant and positive impact on improving self-sustainability. This 
evidence implies that since unregulated non-profit MFIs, compared to regulated for-profit 
MFIs, more effectively reduce poverty with financially stable operation, the institutional 
transformation of MFIs should be carefully conducted in order to achieve a higher social 
impact of serving the poorest of the poor at a financially sustainable manner, helping them to 
overcome poverty.  
Keywords: Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), Transformation, Poverty Reduction, Financial 
Sustainability, Profit Status, Regulation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Thesis  
The primary purpose of this study is to assess and compare the impact of non-profit 
and for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs) on poverty reduction and financial 
sustainability. In particular, this assessment examines which type of institutional nature for 
MFIs is more effective in delivering financial services to the poor in order to fight poverty.    
 
1.2 Statement of Problem  
There has been heated debate on the institutional nature of MFIs in recent years: 
should MFIs focus mainly on poverty alleviation or be making profit? This debate reflects the 
question on what should be the priority of MFIs: poverty reduction or financial sustainability. 
In the early 1980s, Muhammad Yunus founded the Grameen Bank, the first 
organized microfinance institution (MFI) and a non-profit entity to provide financial services 
to low income households that had been conventionally excluded from the formal banking 
system. Over the past few decades, microfinance markets have grown and have been 
considered as a crucial instrument for poor entrepreneurs to start and expand their businesses, 
helping them to generate income, and overcoming poverty. Under such conditions, the United 
Nations (UN) declared 2005 as the International Year of Microfinance, and in the following 
year 2006, the Grameen Bank was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in 
providing microcredit as means of fighting poverty (Grameen Bank, 2014).  
However, as microfinance has developed to meet varying demands (e.g. insurance 
and savings) from clients and investors, it has been challenged for following reasons: (1) 
providing loans to the low-income clients would cause high operating costs (to reach the poor 
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clients in rural area); (2) low rate of return on loan (or high loan default rate); and (3) higher 
dependency on donor’s subsidies, which is closely related to financial self-sufficiency in 
operating MFIs. According to the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) Market 
database, financial self-sufficiency (in the microfinance context) refers to when “an 
institution has enough revenue to pay for all administrative costs, loan losses, potential losses 
and funds”. Indeed, Mersland and Strøm (2010) indicated that “around 41% of MFIs are not 
financially self-sustainable according to a survey by the Micro Banking Bulletin on the basis 
of the MIX 2006 benchmark data set of 704 MFIs”. MFIs have been under pressure to change 
their operating strategies and draw more attention to transformation into for-profits (from 
non-profits) to be financially self-sustainable and viable (Wagenaar, 2012). According to the 
MIX Market in 2009, the number of the for-profit MFIs was 490 out of the 1,161 MFIs 
(roughly 42%), and make up two-thirds of total assets (more than $65 billion worth) (Roberts, 
2013). In this respect, some scholars have argued that profit-oriented MFIs would perform 
better than non-profits in achieving their social and financial missions—poverty reduction 
and financial self-sustainability—since the institutional transformation of MFIs can bring 
more deposits, independence from donors, better management, and finally better financial 
services to the clients (Mersland and Strøm, 2010) 
Moreover, in some cases, regulations on MFIs have also been regarded as a 
countermeasure to preserve financial viability for MFIs. The main objective of imposing 
regulations in the microfinance sector is to operate safe and sound MFIs by addressing 
market failures, information asymmetries between depositors, financial intermediaries, and 
borrowers. For instance, depositors are often exposed to the threat of acerbating the security 
of their deposits since financial institutions utilize and invest the deposits in risky profit-
making business unexplained to the depositors (Yu et al., 2014). Also, in the same manner, it 
can be observed in lending and deposit tasks that financial institutions hardly identify the 
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creditworthy clients due to the fact that only the clients know their own capacity and 
willingness to repay. In this regard, MFIs are more vulnerable to the clients mostly consisting 
of entrepreneurial poor who may not fulfill their obligations to repay. To avoid such systemic 
risks, regulatory measures of MFIs should not only monitor MFIs’ activities to improve the 
safety of depositors, but also remove the risk of having potential defaulters when running 
MFIs (Ledgewood et al, 2013). The most representative regulation on MFIs is capital 
adequacy ratio1 measuring whether MFIs have “a sufficient level of capital required to 
absorb potential losses while providing financial sustainability” (Ledgerwood, 1998, p.224). 
This could be a safeguard to sustain the viability of MFIs. 
Hence, to secure financial sustainability for MFIs, the transformation into for-profit 
MFIs or regulation of MFIs seems necessary. Examples of this transformation can be found 
that El Salvador MFI known as Financiera CALPIA successfully transformed from an NGO 
into a small, strictly targeted group-oriented formal bank. The bank achieved high return on 
equity measuring profitability and its institutional stability, and now it has gained attention as 
a credit worthy institution in the country (Ledgerwood, 1998). Besides, Bolivia MFI, Banco 
Sol transforming its legal status from a community-based lending program to a for-profit 
commercial bank has successfully made financial performance by lending loans to around 
100,000 borrowers, and approximately 99.5% of them has been repaid (Gonzalez-vega et al. 
1997).    
The assertions in favor with institutional transformation of MFIs however, are 
criticized for that if the transformation process proceeds in microfinance industry, the 
transformed MFIs would target better-off clients in order to achieve the commercial and 
financial objectives: profitability and financial sustainability, and loss of the original social 
                                     
1 Total capital/risk-weighted assets (Ledgerwood et al, 2012, p. 338) 
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mission of lending loans to the low socio-economic class of the society as well as to reduce 
poverty. This is commonly referred to as ‘mission drift’ (Mersland and Strøm, 2010) in 
microfinance industry that MFIs shift their main focus from serving the impoverished to fight 
poverty to making profit as well as achieving financial self-sufficiency.  
 
1.3 Importance of Issue  
Even though the practice of ‘mission drift’ is the source of heated debate in the field 
of microfinance, there has been no empirical study evaluating the impact of different nature 
of microfinance institutions—non-profits and for-profits on the one hand; and unregulated 
non-profits and regulated for-profits on the other—with regards to the dual missions of 
poverty reduction and financial sustainability. This study aims to fill such gap and determine 
which legal status of microfinance institutions (MFIs) has made the most contributions on 
poverty alleviation by reaching the poor households as well as financial sufficiency.   
Such study is necessary and important when effective strategies and plans of MFIs 
need to be devised for both poverty reduction and financial sustainability by NGOs, 
government financial agencies, and international development organizations. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This paper attempts to investigate whether transformation of MFIs achieve the goals 
of fighting poverty worldwide and financial self-sustainability. First, it tests whether for-
profit MFIs reduce poverty more significantly than non-profit MFIs do (i.e. for-profits target 
the poorer clients than non-profits). Second, taking into account of regulatory requirement on 
MFIs, it tests whether a regulated for-profit MFI has a more significant impact on alleviation 
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of poverty and financial sustainability than an unregulated non-profit MFI. Specific questions 
are as follows:    
 
 1.4.1 Non-profit MFIs vs. For-profit MFIs 
 Social Mission: Poverty Reduction  
A. Do non-profit MFIs reduce poverty?  
B. Do for-profit MFIs reduce poverty?  
C. Are for-profits more effective in reducing poverty than non-profits? 
 
1.4.2 Unregulated non-profit MFIs vs. Regulated for-profit MFIs 
 Dual Missions: Poverty Reduction and Financial Sustainability  
1.4.2.1 Poverty reduction  
A. Do unregulated non-profit MFIs reduce poverty?  
B. Do regulated for-profit MFIs reduce poverty?  
C. Are regulated for-profits more effective in reducing poverty than unregulated non-profits? 
1.4.2.2 Financial sustainability  
A. Do unregulated non-profit MFIs achieve financial sustainability?  
B. Do regulated for-profit MFIs achieve financial sustainability?  
C. Are regulated for-profits more financially self-sustainable than unregulated non-profits? 
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1.5 Organization of the Paper  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The second section reviews various 
literature in the related area. The third section describes estimation methodology and data 
used in this study. The fourth section discusses the analysis results of the impact of for-profit 
MFIs on poverty reduction in comparison with non-profit MFIs. The following section 
reports on further analysis of the results using profit status and regulation of MFIs. Finally, 
the conclusion and recommendations are presented in the last section.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most studies on microfinance have focused on estimating social welfare of borrowers 
such as income, health, education and women empowerment in a particular MFI or region at 
the micro-level. Some studies have discussed social and financial performance of the 
transformed MFIs since the trend of the institutional transformation of MFIs has emerged in 
recent years. With this regards, literature review is divided into three parts: first part is on 
theoretical framework of institutional transformation of MFIs; second, studies of 
transformation (commercialization) of MFIs; the final part discusses the studies of poverty 
reduction in microfinance sector. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework of Institutional Transformation of Microfinance Institutions   
 
The concept of the institutional transformation of MFIs has not been generalized yet 
in related studies. Broadly, it implies “a change in legal status from an unregulated non-profit 
or non-governmental organization (NGO) into a regulated for-profit institution with enhanced 
service quality and product offering.”2 This could also be referred to as a process of 
transformation from informal to formal MFIs (Srnec et al, 2008). The related literature often 
uses the term ‘transformation’ and ‘commercialization’ interchangeably. According to the 
MIX Market data, the term ‘commercialization’ refers to “the move by MFIs to provide 
services on a financially self-sufficient basis and under prevailing commercial principle and 
regulation.” Christine (2001), one of the first scholars studying the commercialization in 
microfinance sector, defines commercialization as consisting of three main features: 
regulation, competition, and profitability. In this study, the term ‘transformation’ is mainly 
                                     
2 Srnec, Divisová, and Svobodivá , “The Transformation Process in Microfinance institutions,” Agricultura Tropica et 
Subtropica, May 12, 2008. Quoted in UNITUS, “Acceleration model,” Accessed November, 23, 2007, 
http://www.unitus.com/sections/aboutus/aboutus/_os_goals.asp 
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used for clarity since it could more clearly reflect on the status change of institutional 
structure in MFIs.  
The assessment of institutional transformation of a MFI on its performance is 
originally derived from the debate between the welfarist and the institutionalist, referred to as 
the Microfinance Schism (Morduch, 2000). According to the welfarist, since reaching the 
poorest of the poor with the view of reducing poverty materially and non-materially is the 
key objective of the MFIs in spite of the subsidy dependency, the assessment on MFIs should 
be measured by borrowers’ welfare. On the other hand, the institutionalist insist that the 
performance of MFIs should be assessed by the expansion of financial services to low income 
class and operate MFIs at a financially self-sustainable base (Bhatt & Tang, 2001).  
Theoretically, the debate is closely linked to the trade-off between depth of outreach 
and financial sustainability. The term ‘outreach’ as a financial indicator of MFIs is divided 
into two dimensional approaches: breadth and depth of outreach. While breadth of outreach 
measures how many borrowers are being served, depth of outreach measures how poor are 
the borrowers or who is actually being served (Rosenberg, 2009). The major proxy for 
breadth of outreach is number of active borrowers. For depth of outreach, average loan size is 
mainly used based on the assumption that the smaller loan size, the deeper outreach or the 
poorer the borrowers because smaller loan would be lent to poorer clients. Also, the 
percentage of female borrowers often measures depth of outreach since they are often 
regarded as relatively poorer than male borrowers (Olivarse-Polanco, 2005).  
Thus, not-transformed MFIs would provide smaller loans to worse-off clients and 
target more female clients (deeper outreach), while transformed MFIs would lend larger loans 
to better-off clients and the larger number of borrowers (shallower and broader outreach) in 
order to operate MFIs for financial sustainability. In other words, the original purpose of 
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microfinance—serving the poorest of the poor so that they overcome poverty—would be 
abandoned or become tainted towards serving the non-poor clients to achieve better financial 
performances in terms of operational efficiency, profitability, productivity, and especially 
sustainability. It seems that the dual missions of serving the destitute and achieving financial 
sustainability cannot coexist, and the trade-offs are necessarily followed.  
 
 Figure 1. The Outreach and Impact of Institutional Transformation on Poverty Line3 
 
Source: Microfinancegateway (2006) 
Figure 1 shows how the transformation process of MFIs switch the main target 
clients from the poor households (deeper outreach) to the non-poor including less poor clients 
(broader outreach). This analytical framework on transformation should be confirmed and 
proven by empirical studies. Thus, following sections explore the empirical literature of the 
transformation as well as poverty reduction in microfinance sector.   
                                     
3 Srnec, Divisová, and Svobodivá , “The Transformation Process in Microfinance institutions,” Agricultura Tropica et 
Subtropica, May 12, 2008. Quoted in Microfinancegateway, “Helping to improve Donor Effectiveness in 
Microfinance,” Accessed April, 23, 2006, http://www.microfinancegateway.org 
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2.2 Studies in Transformation (Commercialization) of Microfinance Institutions 
 
 2.2.1 Profit Status of Microfinance Institutions 
A few empirical studies that used the profit status for transformation of MFIs 
identified the relationship between profit status of MFIs and performance indicators (outreach 
and financial sustainability). Roberts (2012) observed whether or not for-profit MFIs charge 
higher interest rate than non-profit MFIs by conducting OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) based 
on 258 MFIs for 2009 from MIX Market database and Social Performance Reports. A 
dummy variable was used for the legal profit status of MFIs. It was revealed that even if for-
profit MFIs put higher interest rate on MFI clients, it does not necessary lead to profitability 
and thus financial sustainability since the stronger profit-orientation is highly correlated with 
higher cost in MFIs. The author thus concluded that transformation should be more focused 
on reducing operating costs to achieve financial self-sufficiency.  
Wagenaar (2012) focused more on mission drift using average loan size and a 
percent of female borrowers as proxies for depth of outreach. The author employed panel 
data estimation using 1,558 MFIs over 15 years to capture causal relationship between profit 
status and charter type of MFIs and depth of outreach indicators. Especially, it was specified 
for the category of MFIs’ profit status: first, MFIs that do not transform; and secondly among 
transformed MFIs, remaining non-profit as well as becoming for-profit. The charter type was 
classified into five: NGOs, Banks, Credit Union/Cooperatives, NBFIs (non-banking financial 
institutions), and others. The results showed that average loan size of transformed for-profit 
MFIs is significantly larger than that of non-profits, and the for-profit MFIs have a lower 
proportion of female borrowers. This suggests that outreach of for-profits is shallower than 
that of non-profits. In case of the charter type, most for-profit MFIs, Banks and NBFIs have 
higher average loan size and a lower fraction of female borrowers than those of NGOs. These 
results confirm that mission drift does indeed occur in microfinance sector.  
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Downey and Conroy (2014) simply compared the mean value of several financial 
performance indicators such as a percentage of female borrowers, average loan size, profit 
margin, expenses, operational self-sufficiency, interest rates, and a proportion of risky loans 
between non-profits and for-profits. The division of the profit status for MFIs was based on 
funding source—whether or not MFIs are funded by shareholder’s capital. The data of 460 
MFIs was from MIX Market. They found evidence that there is significant difference in 
profit margin, operational self-sufficiency, and expenses between the two different profit 
statuses of MFIs. Interestingly, the better performance in terms of financial profitability was 
captured in non-profit MFIs. No evidence was found on the significant difference in outreach 
measures (a percentage of female borrowers and average loan size). The implication is that 
non-profit MFIs have higher financial performances (profit margins and operational self-
sufficiency) with equal outreach measures.   
 
 2.2.2. Regulation and NGOs of Microfinance Institutions  
Regulatory status and type of MFIs (NGOs) for the transformation process has been 
dealt with in recent literature. Olivarse-Polanco (2005) investigated the causal relationship 
between the institutional type of MFIs and average loan size (depth of outreach). Unregulated 
NGOs and regulated financial institutions were used as a dummy variable for the type of 
MFIs. To closely observe the movement of outreach, three measures of loan size were 
applied in the study: average outstanding loan / GDP per capita; dollar-years of resources 
from loan / dollar years of resources from income to adjust for time; and average outstanding 
loan / GDP per capita of the poorest 20% to adjust for inequality of income distribution in a 
county. The data sets were utilized of 30 Latin America MFIs over 1999 to 2001 from MIX 
Market data, conducting OLS (Ordinary Least Square). The paper indicates that there is no 
significant link between the type of MFIs and all three loan measures. 
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A study by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2011) using data for 114 MFIs from 62 
countries examined the impact of regulation on MFI’s performances, operational self-
sufficiency (financial revenue / financial expense + loan Loss Provision + operating expense) 
and breadth of outreach (number of active borrowers). A dummy variable was taken for 
regulatory involvement and type of MFIs (NGOs). The researchers revealed that regulated 
MFIs and NGO MFIs do not show better financial performances in terms of operating MFIs 
and reaching the larger number of poor clients.  
Unlike other studies that used a dummy variable of whether or not MFIs are 
regulated, Yu, Damji, Vora, and Anand (2014) utilized capital adequacy ratio4 as a proxy for 
regulation requirement on MFIs, applying OLS (Ordinary least square), Difference-in- 
Difference, and IV (Instrumental Variable). They tested first the causal links between 
regulation on MFIs (capital adequacy ratio) and profitability (return on assets, yields on gross 
loan portfolio, and write-off ratio), and secondly outreach (a percentage of female borrowers) 
and profitability (return on assets). The data sets were 2,409 MFIs over the period of 1995 - 
2012 and were gathered from MIX Market and World Bank database. The results show that 
regulation requirement on MFIs increases profitability for MFIs’ operation and decrease the 
outreach to female borrowers who are relatively poorer clients. Not only that, the more 
female borrower are served, the less profit the MFIs have. Hence, they concluded that there is 
trade-off between serving the poor clients and achieving better financial performance 
(profitability).  
Evidence gathered by Abrar and Javaid (2014) also confirmed the trade-off between 
outreach and financial sustainability. The author employed 382 MFIs in 70 countries for 2003 
to 2009 conducing random effects estimation. It was examined the causal relationship 
between outreach (average loan size) and financial characteristics (operational self-
                                     
4 Total capital/risk-weighted assets (Ledgerwood et al, 2012, p. 338) 
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sufficiency, repayment risk, reciprocal of productivity). Both the regulatory involvement and 
legal status (NGO) of MFIs were taken as dummy variables. The results show that average 
loan size is positively and significantly correlated with those various financial variables 
leading to transformation (or commercialization). It implies that as MFIs lend larger loans to 
(better-off) borrowers, MFIs become more financially self-sustainable. Conversely, MFIs 
lend smaller loans to (worse-off) clients, MFIs get the lower level of financial performance. 
In particular, regulation on MFIs do strongly effect on increasing average loan size, meaning 
that regulated MFIs target the better-off households. Thus, the authors concluded that 
regulation on MFIs results in trade-off between outreach and financial performance. 
 From the literature above, the three things are clearly identified. First, studies of 
transformation utilized diverse methodologies and data sets to observe the institutional 
transformation of MFIs. Second, some studies tried to identify the effect of transformed MFIs 
on either financial performance measuring profitability and financial self-sufficiency or 
outreach measures such as average loan size and a proportion of female clients, while other 
literature utilized both financial sustainability and outreach measures. Third, mixed results 
were reported and thus the controversy over mission drift of MFIs has been still unresolved 
and remains in question with the recent growth of microfinance industry. 
 
2.3 Studies in Impact of Microfinance on Poverty Reduction 
Most of the studies on microfinance are based upon the micro-level data. Much less 
empirical studies of poverty reduction have been carried out to examine whether or not the 
success of microfinance is dependent on the macroeconomic structure using cross-country 
and macroeconomic variables due to reliability of macro data. Yet, several studies found a 
significant relationship between financial services to the marginal clients (gross loan 
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portfolio5) of MFIs and poverty measures (FGT indices6). Imai, Giha, Thapa and Annim 
(2010, 2012) used data sets from 2003 and 2007 covering 61 countries by applying Pooled 
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with an IV (Instrumental Variable), and Random effects 
regression models to check the causal relationship between financial services of MFIs (gross 
loan portfolio) and poverty (FGT indices). The results indicate that gross loan portfolio is 
significantly and negatively associated with poverty measures (poverty headcount ratio, 
poverty gap, and poverty squared gap), which means a rise in financial services to the low 
income households (gross loan portfolio) has a significant impact on poverty reduction. 
Kwak and Lee (2013) also utilized Pooled OLS and IV models by using 78 countries through 
the six regions of the world for 2010. They found out that a country with higher gross loan 
portfolio from MFIs have a significant impact on poverty reduction.  
  
                                     
5 The outstanding principal balance of all of an MFI’s outstanding loans, including current, delinquent, and restructured 
loans, but loans that have been written off. (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2003, p.6) 
6 Foster-Greer-Thorbecke consists of three poverty measures: (i) poverty headcount ratio: the proportion of the population 
that is poor, (ii) poverty gap: the extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line, (iii) squared poverty gap: the 
squares of the poverty gaps relative to poverty line (Poverty Manual, All, JH, 2005, p.69-74)  
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
3.1. Methodology (Model specification)  
The analysis in this study adopts methods used by Imai, Giha, Thapa and Annim 
(2010, 2012) and Das and Khan (2011). The data sets are from 68 countries MFIs from 
around the world for 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2011. Pooled OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares) with an Instrumental Variable (IV) and Random effects regressions are applied to 
estimate the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction on the basis of MFIs’ profit status. 
The empirical models in this study are of the following forms: 
     𝑃𝑜𝑣௜௧ ൌ  𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝒏𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑐௜௧ ൅  𝛽ସ𝑅𝐸𝐺௜௧ ൅ 𝜀௜௧                   ሺ1ሻ      
     𝒏𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ ൌ 𝛿଴ ൅ 𝛿ଵ𝒏𝑶𝑬𝑹௜௧ ൅ 𝜃௜௧                                                                                        ሺ2ሻ       
where, in the equation (1), Pov represents FGT (Foster-Greer-Thorbecke) indices: (i) poverty 
headcount ratio, (ii) poverty gap, and (iii) squared poverty gap; nGLP is (i) log of gross loan 
portfolio and (ii) log of gross loan portfolio per borrower in non-profit MFIs. GDPpc 
indicates log of GDP per capita (at 2005 constant USD); Domc is domestic credit provided by 
financial sector as a share of GDP; REG is the regional dummies (EAP, ECA, MENA SA, 
and SSA); the number of countries and time observation denote i=1,ꞏꞏꞏ, N, and t=1,ꞏꞏꞏ,T, 
respectively; ε and 𝜃 are error terms. The equation (2) tests potential endogeneity of gross 
loan portfolio and validity of an instrument in MFIs. nOER is operating expense ratio 
(operating expense/average gross loan portfolio) of non-profit MFIs.     
     𝑃𝑜𝑣௜௧ ൌ  𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝒑𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑅𝐸𝐺௜௧ ൅ 𝜀௜௧                   ሺ3ሻ      
     𝒑𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ ൌ 𝛿଴ ൅ 𝛿ଵ𝒑𝑶𝑬𝑹௜௧ ൅ 𝜃௜௧                                                                                        ሺ4ሻ       
nGLP and nOER are replaced by pGLP and pOER in the equation (3) and (4) to observe the 
impact of for-profit MFIs on poverty reduction.  
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     𝑃𝑜𝑣௜௧ ൌ  𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝒂𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑅𝐸𝐺௜௧ ൅ 𝜀௜௧                     ሺ5ሻ  
Lastly, equation (5) examines the aggregate effect of MFIs on poverty alleviation by using 
aggregate gross loan portfolio of MFIs ሺ𝒂𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ሻ as a substitute for nGLP or pGLP. 
Since the main aim of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is to provide financial 
services to the poor households for overcoming poverty reduction, the study on performance 
assessment of MFIs should be approached from the welfarist’s perspective centered on 
reducing poverty (Morduch, 2000). The recent empirical studies on microfinance used 
average loan size as a major proxy to measure the poverty level of individual clients (depth of 
outreach). However, Ledgerwood (1999) raises concern that the use of average loan size may 
lead to biased results because it may not reflect the level of borrowers’ welfare (the level of 
poverty). In this sense, this study attempts to directly measure poverty reduction with FGT 
indices (poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap, and poverty squared gap) instead of using 
average loan size. The average loan size (gross loan portfolio) is utilized as a proxy for 
financial support from MFIs to the marginal clients. Moreover, aggregate average loan size of 
MFIs is used to capture the total (volume/size) impact of MFIs on poverty eradication.  
Furthermore, the previous studies with regards to poverty reduction did not consider 
for the institutional transformation of MFIs. Hence, the institutional nature of MFI is applied 
in the analysis based on the two criteria. On the one hand, it examines whether the impact of 
transforming the legal status of MFIs from non-profits to for-profits first on poverty 
alleviation in the next section; and on the other hand, from unregulated non-profits to 
regulated for-profits with regards to the dual missions of MFIs: poverty reduction and 
financial sustainability in the fifth section. More specific description on data sets is followed 
below.  
 
17 
3.2. Data Description   
 
 3.2.1.1 Dependent variables  
Povcal Net in World Bank reports FGT7(Foster-Greer-Thorbecke) indices: poverty 
headcount ratio, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap index over every 38 years from 1981 
on the basis of 2005 PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) and USD 1.25/day poverty line. To 
address the limitation occurred at macro-level studies that cannot capture the activities of the 
poorest of the poor (Morduch, 1999), this study examines headcount ratio (absolute poverty), 
poverty gap (depth of poverty), and squared poverty gap (severity of poverty) measuring the 
different level of poverty (Imai et al., 2012).  
 
 3.2.2 Independent variables 
With the object of measuring microfinance activities, gross loan portfolio (GLP) 
(divided by the number of active borrowers: average loan balance per borrower) is mainly 
used in this study, implying that it measures actual funds disbursed to clients of MFIs. The 
GLP is adjusted for inflation (at 2005 constant USD) standardizing macro-level data sets for 
comparison. Based on Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) Market data reporting the 
profit status of MFIs, the GLP are generated into two: each GLP of non-profit MFIs and for-
profit MFIs. In the equation (1), GDP per capita and domestic credit as share of GDP are also 
included as a measure of economic growth and financial development given that those 
variables play a role of reducing poverty. Lastly, regional dummies are utilized to control 
unobservable regional characteristics (Imai et al., 2012). These data sets are derived from 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and World Bank Indicator (WDI). 
                                     
7 Povcal Net in World Bank reports FGT indices [Headcount Ratio (%), Poverty Gap (%), and Squared Poverty Gap(%)]   
8 FGT indices of 2010 are available in the world bank web site (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?1,0) 
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 3.2.3 Instrumental Variable 
In the equation (1) and (3), IV (also known as 2SLS) is needed to address the issue of 
reverse causality. For instance, an increase in gross loan portfolio would improve the poverty 
level in a country. Conversely, the improvement of poverty in a county would reduce gross 
loan portfolio due to the fact that people overcoming poverty do not need to borrow loans 
from MFIs (Kwak and Lee, 2013). Thus, gross loan portfolio is likely to be endogenous in 
the equation (1) and (3), so that this study uses an instrument, operating expense ratio 
(operating expense/average gross loan portfolio) which is mainly used to measure operating 
efficiency when comparing MFIs (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2003). 
This ratio would be negatively related to gross loan portfolio in that an increase in operating 
expense for MFIs may decrease loans lending to clients. To serve as a valid instrument, the 
variable must be correlated with the endogenous variable, gross loan portfolio, and at the 
same time, not be correlated with FGT indices (headcount ratio, poverty gap, and squared 
poverty gap). In this regard, the validity tests of the IV are conducted and presented in Tables 
3 to 5 (Wooldridge, 2010, p.513-540)  
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4. RESULTS 
 
Through the comparison of performance indicators between non-profit and for-profit 
MFIs, it can be clarified how the activities of the two different types of MFIs have proceeded 
in recent years. With this in mind, first the recent trends in financial performance of MFIs are 
visited on the basis of the profit status over the regions. The next is followed by multivariate 
regression results from Tables 3 to 8, including descriptive statistics (by regions) in Tables 1 
and 2.  
 
4.1 Trends of Financial Performance of Microfinance Institutions 
Trends of the important components related to size and outreach to clients in MFIs 
such as gross loan portfolio, number of active borrowers, and percent of female borrowers are 
described from Figures 1 to 3 below, showing how these factors of non-profits and for-profits 
change over the recent years. 
Figure 2. Trends of Gross Loan Portfolio – Size of MFIs 
 
 
Source: self-compilation from MIX Market data 
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As depicted in Figure 1, in general, gross loan portfolio (GLP) increased over all the 
six regions from 2004 to 2012 regardless of the profit status in MFIs. This confirms that 
microfinance markets had grown during the period. Specifically, the for-profits lent larger 
loans than the non-profits over the last several years except the year 2010 in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This indicates that, in general, the 
size of for-profit MFIs was larger than that of non-profit ones. Also, the slope in the for-profit 
MFIs between 2011 and 2012 had dramatically risen for the regions, meaning that the size of 
for-profit MFIs had significantly expanded. In this regard, this could imply the active 
movement of for-profit MFIs to expand the business in the microfinance sector during the 
period.   
Figure 3. Trends of Number of Active Borrowers - Breadth of Outreach 
 
 
Source: self-compilation from MIX Market data 
 
Number of active borrowers indicates that “the number of individuals who currently 
have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are responsible for repaying any portion of 
the gross loan portfolio” (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2003), basically 
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measuring the scale (or breadth) of outreach. Unlike the trends of gross loan portfolio above, 
the Figure 2 shows the mixed results by regions. First of all, for-profit MFIs in the two 
regions, SA and LAC reached more active borrowers from 2004 to 2012. An interpretation of 
this is that the better-off clients would have been targeted more in SA and LAC since the 
profit-oriented MFIs may access the better-off clients to increase profitability through more 
stable and higher rate of returns on loans. As described in Figure 1, regarding 2011 and 2012, 
an increase in the number of borrowers was more significant for the for-profit MFIs over the 
regions except the MENA, and therefore this could confirm the increasing the extent to 
movement of the profit-oriented MFIs in this sector.  
 
Figure 4. Trends of Percent of Female Active Borrowers - Depth of Outreach (Gender)  
 
 
Source: self-compilation from MIX Market data 
As explained above, since female borrowers in general are regarded as relatively 
poorer than male ones, the number of female clients in MFIs could be a good proxy for 
measuring depth of outreach. In Figure 4, non-profit MFIs overall reached more female 
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borrowers except SA. In case of LAC, more female borrowers were reached by for-profit 
MFIs only in 2012. As confirmed by findings of microfinance literature (Dacheva and 
Gotwalt, 2007; Wagenaar 2012;Yu et al., 2014), this can be interpreted that non-profit MFIs 
reach more female borrowers as well as marginalized clients in the society (deeper outreach).  
Overall, gross loan portfolio rose in both non-profits and for-profits from all over the 
world, and especially the gap of slope in gross loan portfolio between non-profits and for-
profits had been wider by the two regions, LAC and SA than by the other regions in 2011 and 
2012. This implies that the size of MFIs increased over the period 2004 -2012, and the size of 
for-profit MFIs was much larger than that of non-profits especially in LAC and SA over the 
period 2011-2012. Secondly, except MENA, the number of active borrowers in for-profit 
MFIs was bigger than that of non-profit MFIs in 2012. Also, for-profit MFIs in LAC and SA 
had continuously reached more borrowers than non-profit from 2004 to 2012. This indicates 
that broader outreach of the for-profits was observed over all the regions in 2012 and in LAC 
and SA over 2004 to 2012. Lastly, the proportion of female borrowers to total number of 
active borrowers was larger in non-profits than for-profits over the world with the exception 
of LAC and SA during the period 2004 to 2012. As expected, deeper outreach was observed 
in non-profit MFIs. Thus, in general, it can be concluded that the growing active movement 
in for-profit MFIs for recent years 2004 to 2012 in the world based on the trends results: 
larger size of MFIs and broader outreach that may accompany with shallower outreach. In 
particular, the activities of for-profit MFIs were more intense in these two regions, LAC and 
SA.  
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics (by region)   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the data, comprising mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum of the observations used in this study. Table 2 shows 
descriptive statistics by regions and profit status of MFIs that can simply compare the level of 
poverty and capture activities of MFIs over the world in the data sets.   
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Non-profits vs. For-profits 
            
Variable Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max  
Poverty headcount ratio 328 25.54 25.41 0.01 87.83 
Poverty gap 320 11.06 14.42 0.01 90.50 
Squared poverty gap 312 5.82 8.31 0.01 57.34 
Log of GLP 
(Non-profits) 325 14.45 1.43 7.45 17.83 
Log of GLP per borrower 
(Non-profit) 324 6.15 1.25 0.96 9.58 
Operating expense ratio  
(Non-profit) 308 0.37 0.39 0.05 3.35 
Log of GLP 
(For-profit) 312 15.84 1.99 9.97 20.66 
Log of GLP per borrower 
(For-profit) 283 6.81 1.64 2.88 13.02 
Operating expense ratio  
(For-profit) 285 0.30 0.25 0.02 1.60 
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 335 16.35 1.93 9.78 21.06 
Log of GLP per borrower 
(Aggregate) 335 6.60 1.46 2.84 12.86 
Log of GDP per capita 340 7.11 1.06 4.96 9.11 
Domestic credit 335 38.52 32.74 -24.92 185.47 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Regions (2002, 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2011) 
Regions  
Poverty  
headcount 
(%) 
Poverty gap
(%) 
Squared  
poverty gap
(%) 
Gross loan 
per borrower ($) No. of MFIs No. of active borrowers Domestic credit
Gross domestic 
product per 
capita Non-profit For-profit Non-profit For-profit Non-profit For-profit 
EAP 
Total No. 25 25 25 20 16 21 20 21 19 25 25 
No. of 
Countries 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Mean. 22.31 5.36 1.84 311.85 4069.78 12.43 15.05 11514.52 13303.3 45.20 1229.42 
Std. Dev. 9.00 2.90 1.33 196.53 10242.81 12.87 11.02 11728.56 16304.8 52.76 737.38 
ECA 
Total No. 61 54 48 66 62 68 69 67 68 70 70 
No. of 
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Mean. 4.28 1.34 0.65 2269.12 13534.83 6.94 6.67 5638.64 9767.3 35.60 2953.098 
Std. Dev. 7.62 2.26 2.26 2694.26 57090.40 10.97 5.79 7604.31 11075.9 22.11 1674.41 
LAC 
Total No. 82 82 82 82 69 82 79 82 77 85 85 
No. of 
Countries 17 17 17 17 15 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Mean. 10.12 4.45 2.77 917.39 2021.92 12.50 7.25 8130.99 39411.7 48.42 3717.88 
Std. Dev. 13.02 6.70 4.41 792.49 2154.17 11.23 10.31 7671.52 69016.5 24.08 2353.06 
MENA 
Total No. 20 19 17 19 14 20 17 20 16 20 20 
No. of 
Countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mean. 2.68 0.55 0.22 756.98 5790.07 5.90 1.53 13630.35 8514.5 53.14 1703.61 
Std. Dev. 3.37 0.66 0.23 633.05 7387.24 2.53 0.51 17544.80 8030.5 46.24 729.50 
SA 
Total No. 25 25 25 25 24 25 25 25 25 25 25 
No. of 
Countries 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Mean. 29.43 7.43 2.64 212.34 201.75 24.20 15.08 22423.00 1092103.0 52.30 780.48 
Std. Dev. 16.37 5.40 2.26 164.21 87.37 18.77 19.09 28642.16 2287764.0 11.58 400.28 
SSA 
Total No. 115 115 115 112 98 112 102 112 100 110 115 
No. of 
Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Mean. 51.65 24.10 12.54 558.23 1141.06 4.88 5.41 12555.59 24933.4 25.41 767.12 
Std. Dev. 20.66 16.24 9.94 704.27 2016.68 3.61 8.18 26163.55 53726.4 34.14 1116.24 
Total  
Total No. 328 320 312 324 283 328 312 327 305 335 340 
No. of 
Countries 68 68 68 68 66 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Mean. 25.54 11.06 5.82 967.40 4386.979 9.23 7.34 10782.09 111094.40 38.52 2044.93 
Std. Dev. 25.41 14.42 8.31 1514.47 27215.18 11.20 10.15 19115.22 708315.60 32.74 2010.25 
Note) EAP: East Asia and Pacific. ECA: East Europe and Central Asia.  LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean. MENA: Middle East and North Africa. SA: South Asia. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Examining the mean value of poverty level (poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap, 
and squared poverty gap) in Table 2, as expected, SSA experienced the most severe poverty 
over the world, followed by SA. Also, all levels of poverty in SSA are even worse than the 
average level of the world poverty, playing a role of big hurdles for the alleviation of poverty. 
In other words, SSA would be a key region that can improve poverty worldwide through 
MFIs’ activities. However, the average number of MFIs in SSA had not yet been at the 
topmost, but at the lowest position. In case of the other regions, MENA as the only region 
that non-profit MFIs had more borrowers than for-profits (breadth of outreach) shows the 
lowest poverty state. LAC records the highest GDP per capita, and at the same time the 
standard deviation is the largest over the world. This may point out that LAC experienced the 
high level of income inequality.  
Like the percentage of female borrower used as a proxy for MFIs’ depth outreach, 
the size of loan per borrower (gross loan portfolio divided by number of active borrower) is 
an important indicator that can identify who is being targeted (depth of outreach) by the MFIs. 
The non-profit MFIs would provide small loans to the poorer (deeper outreach) while the for-
profits would target the better-off clients for securing the rate of return with high interest rate 
(shallower outreach) (Olivares-Polanco, 2005). Among the regions except for SA, average 
loan per borrowers of for-profit MFIs is larger than that of non-profit MFIs, implying that 
for-profits mainly provided large loans to the better-off clients.  
On the contrary, the average number of active borrowers measuring the breadth of 
outreach in for-profits MFIs is approximately ten times larger than non-profits in the total 
sample. In this regard, taking into account the fact that on average, the number of non-profit 
MFIs is bigger than that of for-profits, it can be summarized that the smaller number of for-
profits reached out to more and better-off clients with larger loans, whereas the larger number 
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of non-profits provided smaller loans to the less number of clients that would be mostly the 
worse-off. Therefore, the recent trend of mission drift is indirectly confirmed that the 
transformation into for-profits may lead the MFIs to target the better-off customers with 
larger loans.  
 
4.3 Regression Results   
 Tables 3 to 8 present the regression analysis results testing the hypothesis of the 
relationship between gross loan portfolio (GLP) and three different poverty indicators 
(poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap, squared poverty gap) measuring the different level of 
poverty (incidence, depth, and severity) in the non-profits, for-profits, and aggregate MFIs. 
Tables 3 to 5 show the pooled OLS results with regional dummies using an instrumental 
variable, operating expense ratio (operating expense / average gross loan portfolio) as a proxy 
for operating efficiency of MFIs. The results of random effects regression are presented in 
Tables 6 to 8.  
27 
Table 3. Pooled OLS Regression Results: Non-profits vs. For-profits (Dependent Variable: Poverty Headcount Ratio) 
 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
3) ‘Middle East and North Africa’ (MENA) is excluded to avoid multicollinearity
MFIs  
Profit Status Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP Log of GLP per borrower 
Log of GLP 
per borrower with IV Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
Log of GLP 
per borrower with IV Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of GLP 
(Non-Profit) 
-0.734 
(0.566)        
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Non-Profit) 
-2.094*** -10.40*** 
 (0.794) (2.375)      
Log of GLP 
(For-Profit) 
-0.253 
   (0.413)     
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(For-Profit) 
-0.226 -8.878*** 
    (0.621) (3.353)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
-0.339 
      (0.453)  
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
-0.567 
       (0.613) 
Log GDP 
per capita 
-11.71*** -11.01*** -7.555*** -11.91*** -11.52*** -8.203*** -11.85*** -11.66*** 
(1.312) (1.306) (1.576) (1.400) (1.455) (1.986) (1.280) (1.303) 
Domestic 
credit 
-0.01000 -0.0159 -0.0344 -0.00909 -0.0180 0.0204 -0.00741 -0.0114 
(0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0306) (0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0424) (0.0210) (0.0203) 
EAP 14.20*** 13.58*** 8.957* 13.12*** 14.47*** 5.632 14.45*** 14.34*** (1.952) (1.847) (4.724) (1.908) (2.045) (6.892) (1.803) (1.791) 
ECA 5.200*** 6.811*** 13.36*** 5.163*** 5.392*** 4.382 5.610*** 5.692*** (1.800) (1.828) (4.342) (1.899) (1.922) (5.154) (1.726) (1.713) 
LAC 14.67*** 14.80*** 15.15*** 14.54*** 14.17*** 3.562 15.00*** 14.68*** (1.983) (1.870) (3.720) (2.128) (2.230) (6.434) (1.928) (1.911) 
SA 16.90*** 15.62*** 10.46** 16.79*** 17.76*** -5.898 17.27*** 16.28*** (3.005) (2.952) (4.749) (3.010) (3.483) (10.52) (2.969) (3.047) 
SSA 35.43*** 35.56*** 34.96*** 35.06*** 35.96*** 23.07*** 35.69*** 35.47*** (2.246) (2.182) (3.760) (2.387) (2.699) (7.101) (2.203) (2.259) 
Constant 100.2*** 97.34*** 124.3*** 95.11*** 89.57*** 133.7*** 95.68*** 92.91*** (11.98) (9.445) (12.39) (11.92) (10.18) (20.7) (11.15) (9.11) 
Observations 309 308 293 296 267 247 319 319 
Adj. R-sq 0.769 0.773 0.687 0.769 0.766 0.611 0.771 0.771 
D-W-Hausman test   0.000   0.0009   
Weak identification test 
(F-statistic)   49.83   15.27   
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Table 4. Pooled OLS Regression Results: Non-profits vs. For-profits (Dependent Variable: Poverty Gap) 
 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
3) ‘Middle East and North Africa’ (MENA) is excluded to avoid multicollinearity 
MFIs  
Profit Status Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP Log of GLP per borrower 
Log of GLP 
per borrower with IV Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
Log of GLP 
per borrower with IV Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of GLP 
(Non-Profit) 
-1.160** 
(0.555)        
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Non-Profit) 
-2.236*** -5.889*** 
 (0.671) (1.542)      
Log of GLP 
(For-Profit) 
-0.735* 
   (0.390)     
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(For-Profit) 
-0.491 -4.045** 
    (0.529) (2.010)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
-0.812* 
      (0.424)  
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
-0.656 
       (0.513) 
Log GDP 
per capita 
-6.120*** -5.490*** -4.087*** -5.994*** -5.786*** -3.796*** -6.064*** -5.963*** 
(0.926) (0.913) (1.015) (0.998) (1.099) (1.210) (0.902) (0.938) 
Domestic 
credit 
-0.00220 -0.00945 -0.0146 -0.00237 -0.0159 0.00381 0.00545 -0.00486 
(0.0135) (0.0146) (0.0198) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0254) (0.0145) (0.0147) 
EAP 1.486 1.205 -0.618 1.078 2.412* -0.961 1.301 1.614 (1.190) (1.187) (3.062) (1.200) (1.414) (4.049) (1.149) (1.146) 
ECA 2.263* 4.114*** 7.432** 2.202 1.986 1.697 2.835** 2.655** (1.354) (1.389) (2.938) (1.380) (1.345) (3.174) (1.261) (1.158) 
LAC 7.430*** 7.806*** 8.382*** 7.614*** 6.840*** 2.246 8.055*** 7.481*** (1.330) (1.276) (2.465) (1.425) (1.502) (3.772) (1.279) (1.205) 
SA 1.130 -0.0125 -2.067 1.684 1.104 -7.815 2.041 0.709 (1.431) (1.435) (3.076) (1.438) (1.863) (6.095) (1.386) (1.462) 
SSA 15.28*** 15.71*** 15.63*** 15.45*** 15.90*** 10.22** 15.81*** 15.67*** (1.615) (1.580) (2.476) (1.676) (1.825) (4.107) (1.553) (1.536) 
Constant 63.04*** 55.25*** 67.60*** 56.95*** 47.65*** 60.86*** 58.33*** 49.36*** (10.44) (6.908) (8.087) (9.449) (7.558) (12.02) (9.142) (6.672) 
Observations 301 300 286 288 260 241 311 311 
Adj. R-sq 0.607 0.628 0.566 0.602 0.589 0.484 0.606 0.599 
D-W-Hausman test  0.0113 0.0331  
Weak identification test 
(F-statistic)   49.36   14.67   
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Table 5. Pooled OLS Regression Results: Non-profits vs. For-profits (Dependent Variable: Squared Poverty Gap) 
 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
3) ‘Middle East and North Africa’ (MENA) is excluded to avoid multicollinearity
MFIs  
Profit Status Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP Log of GLP per borrower 
Log of GLP 
per borrower with IV Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
Log of GLP 
per borrower with IV Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of GLP 
(Non-Profit) 
-0.844** 
(0.385) 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Non-Profit) 
-1.330*** -4.653*** 
(0.460) (1.074) 
 
Log of GLP 
(For-Profit) 
-0.396 
(0.260) 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(For-Profit) 
0.0878 -3.302** 
 
(0.340) (1.457) 
 
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
-0.414 
(0.284) 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
-0.0630 
 
(0.341) 
Log GDP 
per capita 
-3.522*** -3.169*** -1.967*** -3.381*** -3.417*** -1.710** -3.508*** -3.584*** 
(0.562) (0.559) (0.704) (0.604) (0.652) (0.868) (0.552) (0.581) 
Domestic 
credit 
-0.00457 -0.00875 -0.0135 -0.00644 -0.0160 0.00363 -0.000355 -0.00587 
(0.00755) (0.00840) (0.0139) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0188) (0.00847) (0.00824) 
EAP -0.215 -0.184 -1.415 -0.456 0.557 -2.100 -0.286 0.0428 (0.820) (0.785) (2.146) (0.838) (0.856) (2.944) (0.769) (0.716) 
ECA 0.866 2.206** 5.609** 0.766 0.422 0.668 1.274 1.009 (0.942) (0.940) (2.188) (0.921) (0.837) (2.435) (0.825) (0.742) 
LAC 4.685*** 5.027*** 6.007*** 4.570*** 4.346*** 0.593 4.988*** 4.721*** (0.923) (0.862) (1.800) (0.973) (0.936) (2.726) (0.868) (0.785) 
SA -0.851 -1.380 -2.883 -0.557 -0.228 -8.193* -0.311 -0.640 (0.899) (0.857) (2.148) (0.841) (1.060) (4.351) (0.789) (0.847) 
SSA 7.501*** 7.953*** 8.279*** 7.764*** 8.253*** 3.536 7.932*** 7.973*** (1.021) (0.967) (1.785) (1.044) (1.105) (2.956) (0.952) -3.584*** 
Constant 
38.84*** 32.00*** 43.32*** 32.05*** 25.62*** 39.04*** 32.82*** 27.35*** 
(7.192) (4.429) (5.548) (6.212) (4.495) (8.691) (6.116) (4.167) 
Observations 293 292 278 280 254 235 303 303 
Adj. R-sq 0.523 0.527 0.404 0.510 0.499 0.183 0.512 0.505 
D-W-Hausman test   0.0004   0.0017   
Weak identification test 
(F-statistic)   47.74   14.27   
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Tables 3 to 5 describe the pooled OLS results with regional dummies for each 
poverty measures: poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap. When 
the regional dummies are not controlled for, GDP per capita may be overestimated because 
the income level in a country or each region may be a major determinant of poverty level, 
and thus, the omitted variable bias occurs in the estimation models. Also, as explained 
earlier, an instrument, operating expense ratio for the equations using loan per borrower is 
utilized to address the potential reverse causality problem in the column (3) and (6) of 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 with the validity test results. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity 
suggest that there is endogeneity in the equations that loan per borrower is indeed 
endogenous, and then an IV is necessary. The weak identification test to check whether 
there is low correlation between loan per borrower and operation expense ratio indicates 
that the IV is strong enough based on F-statistics results that if F > 10, an IV is strong. To 
support this, correlation matrix and first-stage regression results are given in Appendices 2 
and 3. The correlation matrix presents that all explanatory variables are significantly 
correlated with poverty variables such as poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap, and 
squared poverty gap. An instrument is also highly and negatively correlated with the 
endogenous variable (Log of GLP per borrower). There is no need to use the Sargan over-
identification test because the one instrument for loan per borrower is used (Wooldridge 
2010, p.513-540). 
In the columns (1) and (3) of Table 3, log9 of GLP in the non-profit and for-profit 
MFIs are negatively associated with poverty headcount ratio (incidence of poverty), but 
not significant. In case of log of GLP per borrower in the column (2) and (5), only non-
profit MFIs’ loan is negative and significant at 1% level while for-profit MFIs’ loan is 
insignificant. However, controlling for the endogeneity issue by using an IV, it was found 
                                     
9 This is called the semi-elasticity of the dependent variable (poverty measures) with respect to the independent variable 
(gross loan portfolio) using natural log (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 191)    
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out that log of loan per borrower of the both types of MFIs are negative and significant at 1% 
level, implying that log of loan per borrower reduces poverty. That is, when loan per 
borrower of non-profit MFIs increase by 1%, poverty (headcount ratio, percentage term) is 
reduced by 0.104%. A rise of 1% in loan per borrower of for-profit MFIs alleviates 
poverty by 0.089%. Yet, log of GLP and GLP per borrower in aggregate MFIs are 
insignificant. Log of GDP per capita is, as expected, negative and significant at 1 % level 
in all the estimations. Conversely, the coefficients of domestic credit measuring financial 
development in a country are all insignificant. Regional dummies turned out that all 
regions are positive and significant. This indicates that all regions (EAP, ECA, LAC, SA, 
and SSA) over MENA have higher poverty headcount ratio. These results are consistent 
with the descriptive statistics by regions of table 2 that MENA has the lowest poverty level 
in the world.     
Table 4 reveals the result of the use of poverty gap (depth of poverty) as a 
dependent variable in the pooled OLS. Log of GLP in the non-profits and for-profits in the 
column (1) and (4) are negative and significant at each 5% and 10% level. For the log of 
GLP per borrower, non-profits are solely negative at 1% statistical significance. Using an 
IV in columns (3) and (6), it was found out that log of GLP per borrower is negatively and 
significantly associated with poverty at 1% and 5% level in each non-profits and for-
profits. Log of GLP in aggregate MFIs is negative and significant at 10% level whereas 
log of GLP per borrower is negative, but not significant. Like the Table 3, log of GDP per 
capita is negative at 1% statistical significance while domestic credit is insignificant in the 
all estimations. Also, in case of regional dummies that are statistically significant, the 
results are consistent with the mean value of poverty level in descriptive statistics by 
regions in Table 2. Specifically, in columns (3) of table 4, the coefficient estimate of 
regional dummies where are positive and statistically significant are SSA (0.156), LAC 
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(0.0838), and ECA (0.0743). In Table 3, among those three regions, SSA has the highest 
poverty gap (0.0241), LAC is the second (0.0445), and ECA is the lowest (0.0134).  
Table 5 observes the results replacing poverty gap in Table 4 with squared poverty 
gap (severity of poverty). Log of GLP and GLP per borrower are only statistically 
significant in non-profit MFIs with negative sign. Yet, the inclusion of the IV for non-
profits and for-profits where non-profits (0.0465) has a slightly lager impact on poverty 
reduction than that of for-profits (0.033) shows the consistent results with Tables 3 and 4. 
An interpretation is that a 1% increase in loan per borrower of non-profit MFIs improves 
poverty severity in a county by 0.0465%, and at the same time when for-profit MFIs lend 
more loans by 1%, the poverty is alleviated by 0.033%. In all the equations of Table 5, not 
only log of GDP per capita but also domestic credits turned out the same results of Tables 
3 and 4 that log of GDP per capita is negative and significant, on the other hand, domestic 
credits is insignificant. Besides, the same results in regional dummies of Tables 3 and 4 are 
observed in the Table 5 that the LAC and SSA that have significant values actually 
experience the severer poverty than MENA. Unexpectedly, however, log of GLP per 
borrower with an IV in SA turned out that it is negative and significant, which implies that 
SA has lower poverty level than MENA. This is inconsistent with descriptive statistics 
results by regions in Table 2. Therefore, this result may be biased, and needs to be tested 
with advanced regression techniques.   
In sum, log of GLP per borrower with an IV are negatively and significantly 
associated with all poverty measures (poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap, and squared 
poverty gap) in the two different nature of MFIs. This implies that MFIs reduce poverty in 
all different level. In other words, not only non-profits but also for-profits reach out to the 
poorest of the poor, and thus reduce poverty. In particular, non-profit MFIs have a slightly 
lager impact on poverty reduction than that of for-profit, meaning that non-profit MFIs 
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may reach out to the poorer households or lend more loans to them for fighting poverty 
than for-profit MFIs.  
However, the results of pooled OLS regressions may be biased since the time-
constant or time-varying unobserved factors are not controlled in the models, which may 
cause serial correlation between explanatory variables and error terms (omitted variable 
bias). To eliminate the unobserved effects on the models, fixed effects (FE) and random 
effects (RE) estimations are applied in this analysis; fixed effects control for time-constant 
variables and random effects controls for time-varying variables. The decision on which 
one to use can be made by the Hausman test (1978). Basically, it tests the null hypothesis 
that there is no systematic difference between the two models (i.e. Test: H0: difference in 
coefficients not systematic.) The test results are given in Tables 6 to 8, indicating that 
since the null hypothesis is not rejected, random effects models would be more appropriate 
to be used in our models except for the one model in column (3) of Table 6 that rejects the 
null hypothesis. This is because standard error of the random effects is less than that of the 
fixed effects, implying that random effect estimate would be more efficient.  
Based on this, Tables 6 through 8 report the results of the random effects 
regressions using poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap and squared poverty gap, 
respectively in the same manner that the pooled OLS results are described in Table 3 to 5.  
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Table 6. Random Effects Regression Results: Non-profits vs. For-profits 
(Dependent variable: Poverty Headcount Ratio) 
 
 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses ( )  
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3) P-values in parentheses [ ] 
     4) Hausman test: Random effects should be used in the analysis  
 
In Table 6, the effect of loan per borrower on poverty alleviation is significantly 
observed in only non-profit MFIs at 10% level. In the column (3) that is the most appropriate 
to use fixed effects, the log of GLP in for-profit MFIs is even positively associated with 
poverty headcount ratio at 5 % statistical significance. This implies that for-profit MFIs even 
exacerbate poverty level. As examined in the pooled OLS results, the aggregate MFIs do not 
have any significant impact on reducing poverty.  
MFIs  
Profit Status Non-profit MFIs  For-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP Log of GLP per borrower  
Log of 
GLP (FE) Log of GLP 
Log of GLP
per borrower Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log of GLP 
(Non-profit) 
-0.663 
(0.459)        
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Non-profit) 
-1.111* 
 (0.598)       
Log of GLP 
(For-profit) 
   0.972** 0.398    
   (0.481) (0.414)    
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(For-profit) 
0.0844 
     (0.531)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
      -0.272  
      (0.360) -0.383 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
       (0.513) 
        
Log GDP 
per capita 
-18.69*** -18.18*** -22.55*** -19.34*** -19.10*** -19.24*** -19.12*** 
(1.726) (1.754)  (3.804) (1.712) (1.889) (1.725) (1.767) 
Domestic 
credit 
0.0259 0.0206 0.000740 0.00424 0.00524 0.0294 0.0273 
(0.0434) (0.0431)  (0.0555) (0.0431) (0.0463) (0.0425) (0.0421) 
Constant 166.2*** 160.1*** 169.7*** 155.7*** 159.5*** 165.0*** 162.3*** (11.80) (11.24)  (23.69) (11.60) (11.93) (11.16) (11.17) 
Observations 309 308 296 296 267 319 319 
Number of 
countries 68 68  68 68 65 68 68 
Hausman RE, 
FE Test 
(χ2 ) 
p-values 
[0.8404] [0.3283]  [0.0477] [0.0631] [0.7160] [0.3259] 
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Table 7. Random Effects Regression Results: Non-profits vs. For-profits 
(Dependent Variable: Poverty Gap) 
 
 Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses ( )  
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3) P-values in parentheses [ ] 
     4) Hausman test: Random effects should be used in the analysis  
 
For the poverty gap measuring the outreach to the poorer segments of society, Table 
7 shows that log of GLP and GLP per borrower in all the equations are negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level. In other words, MFIs have a significant impact on 
alleviating poverty regardless of the profit-status. Looking more closely at the results, loan 
per borrower in non-profit MFIs has slightly stronger effects to reduce poverty relative to for-
profit MFIs and even aggregate MFIs.  
MFIs  
Profit Status Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of GLP 
(Non-profit) 
-1.359*** 
(0.340)      
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Non-profit) 
-1.978*** 
 (0.444)     
Log of GLP 
(For-profit) 
  -1.098***    
  (0.311)    
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( For-profit) 
-1.254*** 
   (0.404)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
    -1.265***  
    (0.261) -1.416*** 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
     (0.378) 
      
Log GDP 
per capita 
-1.359*** -8.090*** -8.441*** -8.268*** -8.335*** -8.267*** 
(0.340) (1.123) (1.136) (1.264) (1.098) (1.146) 
Domestic 
credit 
-1.359*** 0.000295 0.00737 -9.67e-05 0.0288 0.0155 
(0.340) (0.0293) (0.0304) (0.0328) (0.0288) (0.0289) 
Constant 92.21*** 79.98*** 87.44*** 77.62*** 89.17*** 77.87*** (7.842) (7.184) (7.962) (8.008) (7.326) (7.226) 
Observations 301 300 288 260 311 311 
Number of 
countries 68 68 68 65 68 68 
Hausman RE, 
FE Test 
(χ2 ) 
p-values 
[0.7326] [0.6569] [0.6142] [0.7143] [0.5942] [0.4151] 
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Table 8. Random Effects Regression Results: Non-profits vs. For-profits 
(Dependent Variable: Squared Poverty Gap) 
 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses ( )  
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3) P-values in parentheses [ ] 
     4) Hausman test: Random effects should be used in the analysis 
  
Taking into account inequality among the poor in the poverty measure (Poverty Manual, 
All, JH, 2005, p.73), the analysis results of squared poverty gap (severity of poverty) are 
given in the Table 8 above. As shown in Table 7, log of GLP and GLP per borrower in non-
profits, for-profits and aggregate MFIs are negatively associated with the poverty measure at 
1% statistical significant. Not only that, the provision of loan per borrower for non-profit 
MFIs puts the largest effect on the improvement of poverty among the MFIs.   
MFIs  
Profit Status Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of GLP 
(Non-profit) 
-0.778*** 
(0.161)      
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Non-profit) 
-0.995*** 
 (0.211)     
Log of GLP 
(For-profit) 
  -0.611***   
  (0.155)    
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(For-profit) 
-0.670*** 
   (0.199)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
    -0.676***  
    (0.125) -0.691*** 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
     (0.183) 
      
Log GDP 
per capita 
-4.333*** -4.078*** -4.261*** -4.272*** -4.028*** -4.249*** 
(0.683) (0.702) (0.694) (0.770) (0.687) (0.709) 
Domestic 
credit 
-0.00329 -0.00678 -0.00327 -0.00682 0.00880 0.00392 
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0180) (0.0158) (0.0161) 
Constant 47.43*** 40.61*** 45.36*** 40.43*** 44.60*** 39.89*** (4.610) (4.543) (4.679) (4.944) (4.417) (4.550) 
Observations 293 292 280 254 303 303 
Number of 
countries 67 67 68 65 68 68 
Hausman RE, 
FE Test 
(χ2 ) 
p-values 
[0.9643] [0.8989] [0.9505] [0.8197] [0.4378] [0.4616] 
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5. FURTHER ANALYSIS ON TRANSFORMATION OF MFIs 
 
To closely explore the transformation of institutional structure in microfinance, 
regulatory involvement of MFIs is also applied to evaluate the effect of MFIs on reducing 
poverty. Specifically, it tests whether a regulated for-profit MFI has more significant impact 
on poverty alleviation than an unregulated non-profit MFI. Moreover, it is worthwhile to test 
whether or not regulated for-profits do achieve the higher level of financial sustainability 
since a MFI could no longer remain without financial soundness for stable management even 
though it helps the poor households to overcome poverty.    
To this end, the same methods used in assessing the impact of profit MFIs above are 
applied in this section. The data sets are 37 countries MFIs over 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010, and 
2011 on the basis of MIX (Microfinance Information Exchange) data reporting the profit and 
regulation status of MFIs and World Bank Indicator. The analyses could more firmly identify 
the transformed status of a MFI, its impact on not only poverty alleviation but also financial   
sustainability in microfinance sector. The final empirical models are written as follow: 
     𝑃𝑜𝑣௜௧ ൌ  𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝒖. 𝒏𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑅𝐸𝐺௜௧ ൅ 𝜀௜௧                   ሺ6ሻ 
where, u.nGLP is (i) log of gross loan portfolio and (ii) log of gross loan portfolio per 
borrower in unregulated non-profit MFIs, which is replaced by r.pGLP and aGLP in order to 
capture the effect of regulated for-profits and aggregate MFIs. 
     𝑶𝑺𝑺௜௧ ൌ  𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝒖. 𝒏𝑮𝑳𝑷௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑐௜௧ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑅𝐸𝐺௜௧ ൅ 𝜀௜௧                   ሺ7ሻ 
All things being equal in the equation (6), Pov (FGT indices) is substituted by OSS10 
(operational self-sufficiency) measuring whether or not a MFI can earn enough revenue to 
cover its total costs in the equation (7) (Ledgerwood, 1998, p.217). That is, the ratio, OSS is 
utilized as a measurement of financial sufficiency of MFIs to observe the effect on financial 
                                     
10 Financial Revenue/ (Financial Expense + Net Loan Loss Provision Expense + Operation Expense) (MIX, 2015)  
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sustainability of MFIs. A ratio of more than 100% presents a MFI is operationally self-
sufficient, implying that it does not need outside financial support for its stable operation.  
 
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics of the variables from unregulated non-profits 
and regulated for-profits utilized in this study. List of countries and correlation matrix are 
shown from Appendices 4 and 5.  
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics: Unregulated non-profits vs. Regulated for-profits 
 
Variable Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max  
Poverty headcount ratio 167 23.08 24.44 0.02 87.72 
Poverty gap 164 9.41 12.2 0.01 52.76 
Squared poverty gap 163 5.085 7.37 0.01 57.34 
Log of GLP 
(Unregulated non-profit) 168 14.57 1.344 11.19 18.14 
Log of GLP per borrower 
(Unregulated non-profit) 166 5.88 1.03 3.44 8.72 
OSS 
(Unregulated non-profit) 164 1.1 0.649 0.15 7.63 
Log of GLP 
(Regulated for-profit) 157 16.79 2.06 11.39 22.38 
Log of GLP per borrower 
(Regulated for-profit) 154 7.049 1.68 2.96 13.02 
OSS 
(Regulated for-profit) 156 1.142 0.27 0.53 3.16 
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 169 16.88 1.94 11.45 22.38 
Log of GLP per borrower 
(Aggregate) 167 6.73 1.57 2.99 12.79 
Log of GDP per capita 170 7.26 0.99 5.31 9.12 
Domestic credit 170 40.09 29.37 -16.13 143.63 
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The results of random effects regression in the equation (6) are described as below 
from Tables 10 through 12. As already confirmed by the results using profit status of MFIs, 
log of GLP and GLP per borrower have significantly negative effects on poverty measures: 
poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap regardless of profit and 
regulatory status of MFIs. Also, except for Table 9 using poverty headcount ratio as a 
dependent variable, on average, regulated for-profit MFIs have less significant effects on 
reducing poverty than unregulated non-profit ones. Specifically, the coefficient of log of GLP 
per borrower in aggregate MFIs is the largest (-1.789) in Table 9. For the poverty gap utilized 
in Table 10, the coefficient value (-1.065) in log of GLP per borrowers for unregulated non-
profits MFIs is slightly larger than that (-0.843) for regulated for-profits at each statistical 
significance 5% and 1%. Lastly, Table 11 shows the same results that the coefficient (-0.562) 
of unregulated non-profits is bigger than that (-0.497) for regulated for-profits Hence, taking 
into account both profit sand regulation status, the effect of not-transformed MFIs 
(unregulated non-profits) on poverty alleviation is still larger.  
 
In the Table 9 above, the mean values of OSS in unregulated non-profits and 
regulated for-profits are larger than 1 (100%), which indicates that the both types of MFIs are 
financially self-sustainable. For reference purpose, when running two sample t-test, the 
results11 shows that there is no significant difference of OSS between unregulated non-
profits and regulated for-profits. Table 13 presents the estimation results of the two different 
forms of MFIs on financial sustainability. Based on the results of Hausman test in Table 13, 
Random effects would be more appropriate in using Log of GLP for unregulated nonprofits 
and regulated for-profits while fixed effects would be preferred to use for Log of GLP per 
                                     
11 The mean difference between the two samples is 0.0375288. As P-value (0.504) in Pr (|T| > |t|) row (under Ha: diff ! = 0) 
is larger than 0.05. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference of OSS between the two samples.  
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borrower from the two different natures of the MFIs. Interestingly, only the Log of GLP per 
borrower from unregulated nonprofits is positively and statistically significant at 5% level. 
This implies that an increase of 1% in loan per borrower from unregulated nonprofit MFIs 
improves the level of operational sustainability by 0.002%. In other words, even unregulated 
non-profits are able to achieve financial sustainability. This may supports the assertion by 
Besley and Ghatack (2004) that socially mission-oriented firms (nonprofits) perform better 
when staffs are fully motived by the mission with strong financial support from donors. 
Moreover, regulation on MFIs does not guarantee better financial sustainability (Olivarse-
Polanco ,2005; Hartarska, V., & Nadolnyak, D.,2007; Hartarska and Ndolnyak, 2011).  
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Table 10. Random Effects Regression Results: Unregulated non-profits vs. Regulated for-profits 
(Dependent Variable: Poverty Headcount Ratio) 
 
 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses ( )  
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3) P-values in parentheses [ ] 
     4) Hausman test: Random effects should be used in the analysis  
 
Institutional 
Transformation 
Status of MFIs 
Unregulated non-profit MFIs  Regulated for-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP Log of GLP per borrower  Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of GLP 
(Unregulated 
non-profit) 
-1.705*** 
(0.407)       
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Unregulated 
non-profit ) 
-1.713** 
 (0.701)      
Log of GLP 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
   
-1.322***
   
   (0.316)   
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
-1.378*** 
    (0.404)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
     
-1.592*** 
 
     (0.335) 
-1.789*** 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
      (0.456) 
       
Log GDP 
per capita 
-21.12*** -21.87*** -20.71*** -21.05*** -19.88*** -20.26*** 
(2.338) (2.416)  (2.365) (2.498) (2.396) (2.439) 
Domestic 
credit 
0.0697 0.0708 0.0660 0.0627 0.0972* 0.0953* 
(0.0502) (0.0520)  (0.0471) (0.0486) (0.0498) (0.0512) 
Constant 198.7*** 189.3*** 192.8*** 183.0*** 190.6*** 178.6*** (15.39) (15.81)  (15.69) (16.74) (15.41) (16.18) 
Observations 165 163  154 151 166 164 
Number of 
countries 37 37  37 36 37 37 
Hausman RE, 
FE Test 
(χ2 ) 
p-values 
[0.6676] [0.0859]  [0.6228] [0.6326] [0.5240] [0.5243] 
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Table 11. Random Effects Regression Results: Unregulated non-profits vs. Regulated for-profits 
(Dependent Variable: Poverty Gap) 
 
 Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses ( )  
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3) P-values in parentheses [ ] 
     4) Hausman test: Random effects should be used in the analysis  
 
 
Institutional 
Transformation 
Status of MFIs 
Unregulated non-profit MFIs Regulated for-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP Log of GLP per borrower Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of GLP 
(Unregulated 
non-profit) 
-1.140*** 
(0.280)      
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Unregulated 
non-profit ) 
-1.065** 
 (0.474)     
Log of GLP 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
  
-0.706*** 
   
  (0.223)    
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
-0.843*** 
   (0.277)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
    
-0.868*** 
 
    (0.227) 
-1.040*** 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
     (0.301) 
      
Log GDP 
per capita 
-9.125*** -9.440*** -8.971*** -9.008*** -8.656*** -8.672*** 
(1.395) (1.451) (1.452) (1.518) (1.449) (1.467) 
Domestic 
credit 
0.0182 0.0214 0.0212 0.0212 0.0366 0.0370 
(0.0325) (0.0335) (0.0320) (0.0325) (0.0328) (0.0331) 
Constant 91.44*** 83.31*** 85.32*** 79.74*** 85.37*** 77.87*** (9.399) (9.488) (9.646) (10.12) (9.361) (9.693) 
Observations 162 161 152 149 163 162 
Number of 
countries 37 37 37 36 37 37 
Hausman RE, 
FE Test 
(χ2 ) 
p-values 
[0.7327] [0.4897] [0.7243] [0.6923] [0.3467] [0.5015] 
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Table 12. Random Effects Regression Results: Unregulated non-profits vs. Regulated for-profits 
(Dependent Variable: Squared Poverty Gap) 
 
 
 Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses ( )  
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3) P-values in parentheses [ ] 
     4) Hausman test: Random effects should be used in the analysis  
 
Institutional 
Transformation 
Status of MFIs 
Unregulated non-profit MFIs Regulated for-profit MFIs Aggregate MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP Log of GLP per borrower Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower Log of GLP 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of GLP 
(Unregulated 
non-profit) 
-0.646*** 
(0.145)      
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Unregulated 
non-profit ) 
-0.562** 
 (0.249)     
Log of GLP 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
  
-0.455*** 
  
  (0.128)    
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
-0.497*** 
   (0.161)   
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
    
-0.460*** 
 
    (0.121) 
-0.545*** 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
     (0.161) 
      
Log GDP 
per capita 
-4.553*** -5.003*** -4.746*** -4.847*** -4.377*** -4.428*** 
(0.851) (0.892) (0.922) (0.965) (0.895) (0.912) 
Domestic 
credit 
0.00135 0.00419 0.00789 0.00676 0.0128 0.0134 
(0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0179) (0.0182) 
Constant 47.46*** 44.54*** 46.78*** 43.47*** 44.10*** 40.38*** (5.613) (5.859) (6.097) (6.454) (5.733) (6.068) 
Observations 161 160 151 148 162 161 
Number of 
countries 37 37 37 36 37 37 
Hausman RE, 
FE Test 
(χ2 ) 
p-values 
[0.6145] [0.8764] [0.8825] [0.7719] [0.3249] [0.5466] 
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Table 13. Fixed and Random Effects Regression Results 
: Unregulated non-profits vs. Regulated for-profits 
 (Dependent Variable: Operational Self-Sufficiency) 
 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses ( )  
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3) P-values in parentheses [ ] 
 
 
Institutional 
Transformation 
Status of MFIs 
Unregulated non-profit MFIs Regulated for-profit MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables 
Log of GLP
(FE) 
Log of GLP 
(RE) 
Log of GLP
per borrower
(FE) 
Log of GLP
per borrower
(RE) 
Log of GLP
(FE) 
Log of GLP 
(RE) 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(FE) 
Log of GLP
per borrower
(RE) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of GLP 
(Unregulated 
non-profit) 
0.112** 0.0478   
(0.0539) (0.0396)       
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Unregulated 
non-profit ) 
 0.202** -0.00966   
  (0.0862) (0.0839)     
Log of GLP 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
  
 0.0142 0.00360 
  
    (0.0171) (0.0123)   
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
( Regulated 
for-profit ) 
 
 0.0260 0.0215* 
      (0.0166) (0.0118) 
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
    
   
 
       
 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
        
        
Log GDP 
per capita 
-0.947** 0.0558 -1.063** -0.00966 -0.259 0.0335 -0.300* 0.0190 
(0.453) (0.0880) (0.464) (0.0839) (0.194) (0.0458) (0.155) (0.0343) 
Domestic 
Credit 
-0.00890 -0.00472* -0.00998 -0.00416 0.00271 0.000441 0.00332* 0.000730 
(0.00631) (0.00282) (0.00631) (0.00254) (0.00238) (0.00136) (0.00185) (0.00102)
Constant 6.712** 0.199 8.031*** 0.436 2.668** 0.841*** 2.979*** 0.821*** (2.838) (0.765) (3.030) (0.540) (1.232) (0.324) (1.031) (0.224) 
Observations 164 164 163 163 156 156 153 153 
Number of 
countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 
Hausman RE, FE 
Test 
(χ2 ) 
p-values 
[0.0524] [0.0043] [0.4046] [0.0241] 
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6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
Microfinance, introduced by Muhammad Yunus in 1987, has been regarded as an 
effective tool for poverty reduction for the poor entrepreneurs, and it rapidly expanded in 
developing countries over the last decade. With the proliferation of the microfinance industry, 
non-profit legal entities faced the issue of financial sustainability for their operation due to 
high operating costs to provide financial services to the destitute, high subsidy dependency, 
and low return rate on loans. With respect to the matter, transforming into for-profit entities 
has appeared as a major solution to serve the impoverished with better financial services. 
However, this new notion has been challenged and hotly debated with the label mission drift; 
that the original social mission serving the poorest of the poor for the poverty reduction 
would switch to targeting better-off clients to achieve financial sustainability by increasing 
profitability and operating efficiency. Even though activities of the for-profit MFIs have been 
largely grown in recent years, no empirical study has analyzed the impact of non-profit and 
for-profit MFIs on the dual missions: poverty reduction and financial sustainability. To fill 
this gap, this study aims to assess which legal status of microfinance institutions more 
significantly contribute on reducing poverty at a financially self-sustainable base. 
In order to identify the recent activities in the both types of MFIs: for-profits and 
non-profits, financial performance of the MFIs were examined using gross loan portfolio 
(size of MFIs), number of active borrower (breadth of outreach), and the percentage of 
female active borrowers (depth of outreach) collected by MIX Market database from 2004 to 
2012. Overall, for-profit MFIs tend to have more gross loan portfolio than non-profit MFIs in 
all regions. This indicates that the size of for-profits seems to be larger than that of non-
profits. Second, in case of number of active borrowers, for-profits served more borrowers 
(broader outreach) than non-profits except for Middle East and North Africa. Yet, the both 
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types of the MFIs have the very similar trends in those regions. Third, while for-profit MFIs 
attracted more female borrowers in South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean only in 
2012, non-profit MFIs in other regions and years had more female clients (deeper outreach). 
Therefore, based on the recent trend of the financial performance in MFIs, it can be 
confirmed that, in general, for-profit MFIs ran larger size of the business, targeted the bigger 
portion of clients (broader outreach), and served lower fraction of female borrowers 
(shallower outreach).    
Second, for the empirical analysis, this paper adopts the estimation method used in 
the study of Imai, Giha, Thapa and Annim (2010, 2012) and Das and Khan (2011): Pooled 
OLS with two-stage least squares and Random effects regressions, and covers 68 countries 
for 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2011. According to the analysis, the non-profits, for-profits, 
and aggregate MFIs significantly reduce poverty. However, the overall net impact of non-
profit MFIs on poverty (FGT indices) is slightly larger than that of for-profit MFIs and 
aggregate MFIs. These results are consistent with studies by Imai, Giha, Thapa and Annim 
(2010, 2012) and Kwak and Lee (2013) that a country with higher gross loans portfolio in 
microfinance institutions has a significantly negative impact on poverty measures (incidence, 
depth, and severity of poverty) controlling for other factors with significant regional effects. 
Also, controlling for endogeneity (an instrumental variable) associated with loans in each 
profit status of MFIs, the results of this study show that loan per borrower and poverty 
measures are significantly and negatively associated as well.  
Furthermore, to firmly observe the effect of institutional transformation of MFIs on 
poverty reduction and financial sustainability, gross loan portfolio (GLP) and operational 
self-sufficiency (OSS) ratio are divided into two: each GLP and OSS of an unregulated 
nonprofit (non-transformed) MFI and a regulated for-profit (transformed) MFI. The analysis 
results made a final conclusion of this paper that on average, non-transformed MFIs have a 
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more significant impact on alleviating poverty and even financial sufficiency than 
transformed MFIs. Thus, given that non-transformed MFIs play a more significant role of 
poverty reduction with financially stable operation than transformed ones, the institutional 
transformation (or commercialization) of MFIs should be more carefully conducted in order 
to achieve a higher social impact of serving the poorest of the poor at a financially sustainable 
manner, helping them to overcome poverty. David Roodman (2012) offers significant insight 
into the transformation of MFIs that “The transformation of nonprofits may have been 
necessary historically as the pioneers felt their way to capitalism, but perhaps today’s MFIs 
founders need not repeat history. If the destination of profit-making, why not just go directly?” 
(Due Diligence: An impertinent inquiry into microfinance, 2012, p.234) 
However, these analysis results should not be generalized and applied to all other 
microfinance programs due to the shortcomings. First, since this study was conducted on 
macro-level data sets collected from MIX Market based on self-reporting system, it has 
limitation to closely observe the cases of the recipient borrowers in developing countries. Not 
only that, taking into account the fact that either non-profits strongly supported by donors or 
financially surviving not-for-profits would be included in the data sets, positive reporting bias 
may have an effect on the results. Second, since there are still varying definitions of the 
transformation or commercialization in related literature, the results may be different from 
this paper according to how to define institutional transformation of MFIs. Hence, given that 
this study puts first step forward exploring the impact of the institutional nature of MFIs on 
poverty reduction and financial sustainability, more concrete data sets on institutional 
transformation: for-profits and regulation of MFIs need to be used and estimated to conduct 
performance assessment for MFIs over the world.     
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Appendix 1. List of Countries by Regions and Income Level 
: Non-profits vs. For-profits 
 
Low income countries Lower middle income countries 
Upper middle income 
countries High income countries 
Country Region Country Region Country Region Country Region
Burkina Faso SSA Armenia ECA Albania ECA Argentina LAC 
Burundi SSA Bangladesh SA Azerbaijan ECA Chile LAC 
Cambodia EAP Bolivia LAC Bosnia and Herzegovina ECA Russia ECA 
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
SSA Cameroon SSA Brazil LAC   
Ethiopia SSA Congo, Republic of the SSA Bulgaria ECA   
Guinea SSA Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) SSA 
China, People's 
Republic of EAP   
Haiti LAC East Timor (Timor-Leste) EAP Colombia LAC   
Madagascar SSA El Salvador LAC Costa Rica LAC   
Malawi SSA Georgia ECA Dominican Republic LAC   
Mozambique SSA Ghana SSA Ecuador LAC   
Nepal SA Guatemala LAC Jordan MENA  
Niger SSA Honduras LAC Kazakhstan ECA   
Rwanda SSA India SA Macedonia ECA   
Sierra Leone SSA Indonesia EAP Mexico LAC  
Sudan SSA Kenya SSA Panama LAC   
Tanzania SSA Kyrgyzstan ECA Paraguay LAC   
Uganda SSA Morocco MENA Peru LAC  
  Nicaragua LAC Romania ECA   
  Nigeria SSA Serbia ECA   
  Pakistan SA South Africa SSA  
  Palestine MENA     
  Philippines EAP     
  Senegal SSA  
  Sri Lanka SA     
  Tajikistan ECA     
  Ukraine ECA  
  Yemen MENA     
  Zambia SSA     
Note) This table is based on World Bank Income Classification.   
EAP: East Asia and Pacific ECA: East Europe and Central Asia LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean MENA: Middle 
East and North Africa SA: South Asia  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa  
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Appendix 2. Correlation Matrix Based on Profit Status of MFIs 
: Non-profits vs. For-profits 
 
Poverty 
headcount
Poverty  
gap 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs Aggregate Log of 
GDP per 
capita 
Domestic 
credit Log of GLP 
Log of 
GLP per 
borrower 
Operating 
expense 
ratio 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of 
GLP per 
borrower 
Operating 
expense 
ratio 
Log of 
GLP 
Log of 
GLP per 
borrower 
Poverty head 
count ratio 1.0000             
Poverty gap 0.8359 1.0000 (0.0000) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
0.7996 0.9716 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log of GLP 
(Non-profit) 
-0.2716 -0.3082 0.2902 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Non-profit) 
-0.4358 -0.4 -0.3497 0.5491 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
 
Operating 
expense ratio  
(Non-profit) 
0.3102 0.3138 0.3524 -0.3535 -0.3398 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
 
Log of GLP 
(For-profit) 
-0.346 -0.3872 -0.3551 0.4271 0.2782 -0.0926 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1168) 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(For-profit) 
-0.4515 -0.3886 -0.2935 0.3508 0.5597 -0.148 0.5902 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0165) (0.0000)   
 
Operating 
expense ratio  
(For-profit) 
0.4045 0.3873 0.3982 -0.2467 -0.2714 0.4557 -0.2590 -0.3164 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
 
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
-0.341 -0.3704 -0.3246 0.6323 0.431 -0.1373 0.9257 0.6405 -0.2618 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log of GLP 
per borrower 
(Aggregate) 
-0.4725 -0.3952 -0.3065 0.3976 0.714 -0.1628 0.5959 0.9465 -0.3079 0.6726 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
 
Log of GDP 
per capita 
-0.7774 -0.6659 -0.6039 0.2739 0.4731 -0.1244 0.354 0.4865 -0.1813 0.3696 0.5228 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Domestic 
credit 
-0.3604 -0.3388 -0.3263 0.1803 0.1084 -0.0942 0.3615 0.2555 -0.0777 0.3512 0.2086 0.4754 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1947) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)  
Note) P-values in parentheses
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Appendix 3. First Stage Regression Results 
: Non-profits vs. For-profits 
(Dependent variable: Log of GLP per borrower) 
 
(1) Dependent variable of the second stage: Poverty Headcount Ratio 
 
MFIs  
Profit Status  Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables  Log of GLP per borrower Log of GLP per borrower 
Operating expense ratio -0.932*** -1.353*** (0.1321) (0.118) 
Log of GDP per capita 0.3608*** 0.39*** (0.0766) (0.118) 
Domestic credit -0.002 0.005* (0.002) (0.003) 
EAP -0.576** -0.954** (0.27) (0.469) 
ECA 0.721*** -0.162 (0.233) (0.3913) 
LAC 0.211 -1.051*** (0.223) (0.383) 
SA -0.809*** -2.635*** (0.269) (0.438) 
SSA  0.026 -1.075*** 
(0.225) (0.399) 
Constant 3.906*** 5.256*** (0.56) (0.864) 
Observations 293 247 
Adj. R-sq 0.442 0.413 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(2) Dependent variable of the second stage: Poverty Gap 
 
MFIs  
Profit Status  Non-profit MFIs  For-profit MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables  Log of GLP per borrower  Log of GLP per borrower 
Operating expense ratio  -0.926*** -1.335*** 
 (0.132) (0.348) 
Log of GDP per capita  0.347*** 0.403*** 
 (0.077) (0.121) 
Domestic credit  -0.002 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
EAP  -0.518* -0.831* 
 (0.274) (0.482) 
ECA  0.793*** -0.009 
 (0.241) (0.412) 
LAC  0.281 -0.938** 
 (0.228) (0.401) 
SA  -0.757*** -2.503*** 
 (0.272) (0.452) 
SSA  
0.078  -0.942** 
 (0.229) (0.415) 
Constant  3.928*** 5.03*** 
 (0.566) (0.884) 
Observations  286 241 
Adj. R-sq  0.432 0.406 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(3) Dependent variable of the second stage: Squared Poverty Gap 
   
MFIs  
Profit Status  Non-profit MFIs  For-profit MFIs 
Explanatory  
variables  Log of GLP per borrower  Log of GLP per borrower 
Operating expense ratio  -0.918*** -1.331*** 
 (0.133) (0.353) 
Log of GDP per capita  0.346*** 0.392*** 
 (0.078) (0.122) 
Domestic credit  -0.002 0.006* 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
EAP  -0.395 -0.741 
 (0.284) (0.501) 
ECA  0.892*** 0.091 
 (0.258) (0.442) 
LAC  0.402* -0.837** 
 (0.24) (0.423) 
SA  -0.634** -2.42*** 
 (0.283) (0.47) 
SSA  
0.195  -0.851* 
 (0.241) (0.436) 
Constant  3.816*** 4.993*** 
 (0.575) (0.902) 
Observations  278 235 
Adj. R-sq  0.417 0.388 
Note 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 4. List of Countries by Regions and Income Level 
: Unregulated non-profits vs. Regulated for-profits 
 
Low income countries Lower middle income countries 
Upper middle income 
countries High income countries 
Country Region Country Region Country Region Country Region
Cambodia EAP Bolivia LAC Brazil LAC Chile LAC 
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the 
SSA East Timor (Timor-Leste) EAP Bulgaria ECA Russia ECA 
Haiti SSA El Salvador LAC 
China, 
People's 
Republic of 
EAP   
Malawi SSA Ghana SSA Colombia LAC   
Sierra Leone SSA Honduras LAC Dominican Republic LAC   
Sudan SSA India SA Ecuador LAC   
Tanzania SSA Indonesia EAP Macedonia ECA   
Uganda SSA Kenya SSA Mexico LAC   
  Nicaragua LAC Panama LAC   
  Nigeria SSA Paraguay LAC   
  Pakistan SA Peru LAC   
  Palestine MENA     
  Philippines EAP     
  Sri Lanka SA Haiti    
  Yemen MENA Uganda    
  Zambia SSA     
Note) This table is based on World Bank Income Classification.   
EAP: East Asia and Pacific ECA: East Europe and Central Asia LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean MENA: Middle 
East and North Africa SA: South Asia  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa  
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Appendix 5. Correlation Matrix Based on Profit Status and Regulation of MFIs 
: Unregulated non-profits vs. Regulated for-profits 
 
 
Poverty 
headcount
Poverty  
gap 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
Unregulated non-profit MFIs Regulated for-profit MFIs Aggregate Log of 
GDP per 
capita 
Domestic 
credit Log of GLP 
Log of 
GLP per 
borrower 
Operational
Self-
Sufficiency
Log of 
GLP 
Log of 
GLP per 
borrower 
Operational
Self-
Sufficiency
Log of 
GLP 
Log of 
GLP per 
borrower 
Poverty head count 
ratio 1.0000   
Poverty gap 0.9648 1.0000 (0.0000) 
Squared poverty 
gap 
0.9145 0.9801 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log of GLP 
(Unregulated non-
profit) 
-0.1252 -0.0732 -0.0262 1.0000 
(0.1091) (0.3549) (0.7413)  
 
Log of GLP per 
borrower 
(Unregulated non-
profit) 
-0.4358 -0.3384 -0.2816 0.5055 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
        
Operational 
Self-Sufficiency  
(Unregulated non-
profit) 
-0.1409 -0.1185 -0.0960 0.1195 0.2716 1.0000 
(0.0746) (0.1382) (0.2314) (0.1276) (0.0005)  
       
Log of GLP 
(Regulated for-
profit) 
-0.3866 -0.3282 -0.2946 0.3650 0.4288 0.0097 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9046)  
 
Log of GLP per 
borrower 
(Regulated for-
profit) 
-0.3361 -0.2509 -0.1988 0.3404 0.6215 0.1278 0.6369 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1178) (0.1178) (0.0000)  
     
Operational 
Self-Sufficiency 
(Regulated for-
profit) 
-0.2859 -0.2849 -0.2855 0.0573 0.1707 0.1600 0.0917 0.2946 1.0000 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.4789) (0.0337) (0.0482) (0.2548) (0.0002)  
    
Log of GLP 
(Aggregate) 
-0.3107 -0.2539 -0.2033 0.5087 0.5207 0.0476 0.9734 0.6885 0.0897 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0095) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5450) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2653) 
Log of GLP per 
borrower 
(Aggregate) 
-0.4137 -0.3337 -0.2782 0.3462 0.7175 0.1406 0.7293 0.9404 0.2376 0.7729 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0733) (0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
 
Log of GDP per 
capita 
-0.7941 -0.7111 -0.6557 0.0475 0.4117 0.0476 0.3728 0.3491 0.1786 0.3245 0.4114 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5412) (0.0000) (0.5446) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0257) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Domestic credit -0.3863 -0.3855 -0.3807 -0.0690 0.1239 -0.0957 0.2128 0.1942 0.0764 0.1268 0.1546 0.4598 1.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3742) (0.1118) (0.2230) (0.0000) (0.0158) (0.3434) (0.1006) (0.0460) (0.0000) 
Note) P-values in parentheses
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Appendix 6. Source of Data 
Variable Source URL 
FGT Indices 
(Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke) 
World Bank http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?0
GDP per capita 
(at 2005 constant 
USD) 
World Bank http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx 
Domestic Credit 
Provided  
by Financial Sector 
(% of GDP) 
World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS 
Gross Loan Portfolio
Microfinance 
Information 
Exchange 
http://www.mixmarket.org/ 
 
Number of Active 
Borrowers 
Microfinance 
Information 
Exchange 
Number of 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
Microfinance 
Information 
Exchange 
Operating Expense 
Ratio 
Microfinance 
Information 
Exchange 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Microfinance 
Information 
Exchange 
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